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The Penal Characteristics of Conventional
International Criminal Law
by M. Cherif Bassiouni*
nternational criminal law is a product of the convergence of two
different legal disciplines which have emerged and developed ostensibly
along different paths to be complementary but co-extensive, and separate." These two disciplines are the criminal aspects of2 international law
and the international aspects of national criminal law.

The criminal aspects of international law consist of a body of international proscriptions which criminalize certain types of conduct irrespective of particular enforcement modalities and mechanisms.3 A study of
the origins and development of the criminal aspects of international law
reveals that it deals essentially, if not exclusively, with substantive international criminal law or international crimes." As codified by this writer, 5
* Professor of Law, DePaul University;, Secretary-General, International Association of
Penal Law; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences.
ISee M. C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 19
(1980) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT CODE].
2 See, e.g., 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (K.C. Bassiouni & V.P.
Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 1 TREATISE ; Jescheck, InternationalCriminalLaw:
Its Object and Recent Developments, in 1 TREATISE, supra, at 49; Ryu & Silving, International Criminal Law-A Search for Meaning, in 1 TREATISE, supra, at 22; DRAFT CODE,
supra note 1, at 27 n. 3. See also, e.g., H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LEs PRNCtnES MODERNES
Du DROIT PENAL INTERNATIONAL (1928); N. Lvi, Dmrrro PENAL INTERNAZioNALE (1944); H.
JESCHECK, Dm VERANTWORTLICHKIT DER STAATSORGANE NACH VOLKERSTRAFECHT (1952); S.
GLASER, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DU DRorr INTERNATIoNAL PENAL (1954); A. QuiNTANO-RIPOLES, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL PENAL (2 vols. 19551957); INTERNATIONAL CRiMINAL LAW (G. Mueller &E. Wise eds. 1965); D. OEIiLE , INTERNATIONALES STRAFREcHT (1973); C. LOMBOIS, DRorr PENAL INTERNATIONAL (2d ed. 1979).

3 Such enforcement mechanisms are: (1) the direct enforcement scheme which precognizes the establishment of an international criminal court, and (2) the indirect enforcement scheme which relies upon the processes of extradition, prosecution, and judicial assistance for the enforcement of international proscriptions. See DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at
22-27. See also Mueller & Besharov, The Existence of InternationalCriminal Law and Its
Evolution to the Point of its Enforcement Crisis, in 1 TREATISE, supra note 2, at 5.
4DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 3-19. See also supra notes 2 and 3.
5 DRAFT CODE, supra note 1. See also S. GLASER, Dsorr INTERNATIONAL PENAL CONVENTIONEL (2 vols. 1977-1979); V. PELLA, LA CODICATION DU DsorT PENAL INTERNATIONAL
(1922).
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these crimes are: aggression, war crimes, unlawful use of weapons, crimes
against humanity, genocide, apartheid, slavery and slave-related practices, torture, unlawful medical experimentation, piracy, hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats, taking of civilian hostages, unlawful use of the
mails, drug offenses, falsification and counterfeiting, theft of archeological
and national treasures, bribery of public officials, interference with submarine cables, and international traffic in obscene publications. Although
some of these crimes emerge from customary international law, they are
also included in one form or another in conventional international criminal law.
The bases for considering these twenty acts as international crimes
according to the sources of international law are as follows: (1) existing
international conventions which consider the act in question an international crime; (2) recognition under customary international law that such
conduct constitutes an international crime; (3) recognition under general
principles of international law that such conduct is or should be deemed
violative of international law and about which there is a pending draft
convention before the United Nations; and (4) prohibition of such conduct by an international convention though not specifically stating that it
constitutes an international crime and which is also recognized in the
writings of scholars as such. The last two rationales for inclusion of a
certain type of act or conduct in international criminal law may be challenged on the grounds of the lex lata but could be considered as de lege
ferenda until they are embodied in specific multilateral conventions having the penal characteristics of international criminal law described later
in this article. These categories include: torture, unlawful human experimentation, and theft of archeological and national treasures in time of
peace, and bribery of foreign public officials.
The very nature of all these acts and their definition in the applicable international instruments and under customary international law indicates that there are no common or specific doctrinal foundations that
constitute the legal basis for including a given act in the category of international crimes. The only basis which now exists is empirical or experiential; conventional and customary international law implicitly or explicitly
establish that a given act is part of international criminal law. Nevertheless, in examining separately the twenty international crimes previously
mentioned, there are two alternative requirements for proscribed conduct; namely, it must contain either an international or transnational element in order for it to be included in the category of international crimes.
In other words, the conduct in question must either rise to the level
where it constitutes an offense against the world community delicto jus
gentium or the commission of the act must affect the interests of more
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than one state.' Regrettably, international criminal legal doctrine has not
further defined the meaning and content of each of these two elements,
and no specific criteria exist to determine whether a type of conduct
raises to such a level of international opprobrium to be considered within
the meaning of the "international" element. Similarly, the undefined
"transnational" element could encompass a multitude of activities which
may affect the interests of more than one state, involve transborder activities or involve nationals of more than one state. This is potentially a very
elastic concept. Obviously, these elements need further doctrinal clarification, but it is not within the scope of this article to provide such
clarification.
Regardless of how a given conduct becomes an international crime,
an empirical or experiential observation supports the conclusion that an
international crime is any conduct which is designated as a crime in a
multilateral convention recognized by a significant number of states. Further, provided the international instrument contains one of the seven penal characteristics described later in this article, its existence must be evidenced by specific treaty provisions.
It must be observed that because there have been few efforts to create a direct enforcement system, all international criminal law conventions rely on the indirect enforcement system.7 That system is predicated
on the assumption, by each signatory state to an international criminal
law convention, to enforce its provisions under its national criminal laws
and to cooperate in the prosecution and punishment of such offenders.
This system is predicated on the maxim of Hugo Grotius aut dedere aut
punire,8 which was rephrased by this writer as aut dedere aut judicare.9
The object of international criminal justice is no different than that of
any national criminal justice system: to prosecute those who are accused
of criminal violations and eventually punish those found guilty, and not
simply to punish all those accused of such violations as the words aut
punire imply. Under such a scheme, international crimes established by
conventional or customary international law must be enforced by the national criminal laws of the states. The concomitant duty to prosecute or
extradite and to cooperate with other states in the prevention and suppression of such conduct is imposed upon the signatory states. In that
respect, the enforcement of international criminal law has shaped the rea See DRAFT

CODE, supra note 1, at 40-44. But see 0. TRIEFTERER, DOGMATISCHE UNER-

SUCHUNGEN zUR ENTWICKLUNG DES MATERIELLEN VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS SEIT NURNBERG (1966).
7See DRAFT CODE, supra notel, at 22-27. See also Mueller & Besharov, supra note 3.

a See H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELL AC PACIS, BOOK II, CHAP. XXI, § IV(1) (1624) in THE
RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. Campbell trans. 1901).
See M.C. BAssiouNi, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER 7 (1974);
1 M.C. BAssIouN, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 1, § 2-1
(1983).
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quired contents of an international criminal law convention, and it has
determined in part its characteristics. Accordingly, an international criminal law convention which explicitly or implicitly recognizes certain conduct as an international crime establishes the duty upon signatory states
to criminalize the prohibited conduct, to prosecute accused violators or to
extradite accused violators to other states desirous of prosecuting them,
and to cooperate with other states in the prevention and suppression of
such conduct. Additionally, such a convention could also precognize the
establishment of a direct enforcement scheme, such as an international
criminal court for the prosecution of such offenses.
A textual analysis of some relevant treaty provisions in the twenty
categories of international crimes reveals that the objectives of an international criminal law convention are: (1) to explicitly or implicitly declare
certain conduct a crime under international law; (2) to criminalize the
conduct under national law; (3) to provide for the prosecution or extradition of the alleged perpetrator; (4) to punish the person found guilty; (5)
to cooperate through the various modalities of judicial assistance in the
enforcement of the convention; (6) to establish a priority in theories of
jurisdiction and perhaps recognize the applicability of universal jurisdiction; (7) to refer to an international criminal jurisdiction; and, (8) to exclude the defense of superior orders.
All these characteristics, which ideally should be contained in every
international criminal law convention, are not found in every international criminal law convention. The conclusion of this writer is, however,
that due to the decidedly penal nature of these features, the existence of
any one of these features in a particular convention makes the convention
part of international criminal law.
The various conventions on international criminal law do not all follow the same pattern of imposing upon signatory states the identical duty
to criminalize the prohibited conduct under their national laws, to prosecute or extradite, or to cooperate with other states in the prevention and
suppression of such conduct. Additionally, these conventions do not commonly define such conduct as an international crime or require the establishment of an international criminal court for the prosecution of such
offenses. This lack of consistency is in part due to the fact that these
conventions have been elaborated over a period of more than 220 years,
in different venues and with different participants who frequently have
not taken cognizance of the developing techniques of international criminal law.10 It must be emphasized that the drafters of these conventions,
with the exception of those in the area of the regulation of armed con10

See, e.g., DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 2-3. For a historical analysis, see M. TRAvERS,

La Daorr PENAL INTERNATIONAL ET SA MISE EN OEUVRE EN TEMPS DE PAIX ET EN TEMPS DE

GuERRE (5 vols. 1920-1922). See also note 35 infra.
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flicts, have been mostly diplomats or political representatives of their respective governments. There has been limited participation in the drafting processes from specialists in the field of criminal law, and even lesser
participation by the few specialists in international criminal law.1 Consequently, political considerations may be more prevalent in the drafting of
these conventions. For example, if at a given time a representative of a
state determines that the notion of universal jurisdiction is not politically
palatable to his decisionmakers, he might influence his colleagues not to
include such a provision irrespective of its merits in international criminal law doctrine. This is particularly true when the provision specifically
provides that the prohibited conduct constitutes "a crime under international law;" the political considerations attaching to the use of this nomenclature have been a deterrent to its inclusion in international criminal law conventions. Thus, what seemed to be acceptable terminology in
the days of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, and certainly
3
until the 1948 Genocide Convention," is no longer readily used.2
In international criminal law conventions of the 1970's, starting with
the Hague Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
of December 16, 1970,14 the tendency has been to include very short provisions relating to prosecution, extradition, jurisdiction and judicial assistance, and to place these provisions toward the end of the convention as
secondary procedural matters. Nevertheless, while the development of a
pattern and similarity of language would be more helpful in establishing
international custom,1 5 consistency in terminology would not be sufficient
to provide the specificity necessary to enforce penal provisions in a manner that produces uniform application in the different legal systems of
the world.
" See DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 19-20. This is what led the author to prepare the
draft international criminal code, which addresses itself to the problems of harmonization
and consistency in international obligations arising under international criminal law
conventions.
12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
Is For example, the Working Group on the Draft Convention on the Prevention and
Suppression of Torture of the Commission on Human Rights, while it has not reported out
the Draft Convention, has already deleted Article I which states that "torture is a crime
under international law." See Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NG0/213 (1978). See also Bassiouni & Derby, An Appraisal of Torture in International Law and Practice, 48 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENAL
[R.LD.P.] 17, 284 (1977) (commentary on Article I).
14 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.LA.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. See also R. FIEDLANDER, TERRORisM: DoCuMENTs OF IERNATONAL AND LocAL CONTROL (3 vols. 1979-82).
15 See A. D'AMATo, THE CONcEpr OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971). See also
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. Ray. 1110
(1982).
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Each category of international crimes seems to have developed a life

and pattern of development of its own."' In some cases, such as the regulation of armed conflict, the prohibition against slavery and slave-related
practices and international control of drugs, there has been not only a
number of succeeding conventions (each one relying on its predecessor to
reinforce its provisions or to develop more specialized conventions on
more specific aspects of the prohibited practice), but there has also been
an attempt to develop some direct mechanism of enforcement. To a large
extent, the International Committee of the Red Cross is a very workable
and effective example of a quasi-direct enforcement mechanism regarding
the regulation of armed conflict. 7. The international narcotics system
with the existence of a commission and other structures is another example of direct enforcement. However, political considerations have largely
hampered the opportunities for rendering that system more effective."" In
the slavery area, the International Labour Organisation's development of
additional instruments for the prevention, suppression and control of
slave-related practices is another example of progressive development."
Perhaps the difference between these areas of international criminal law
and others which have not developed progressively, is that these three
areas have had existing international structures which furthered the advancement of the areas relative to their work. Thus the critical factor in
the progressive development of international criminal law is the existence
of institutional structures that spur such growth and development. 20
As a corollary to this observation, it can be observed that where there
has been a progressive development of international instruments there
has also been a progressive development of legal provisions reflecting
more specificity in their content and in the duties they establish. Thus,
where there are more conventions on a particular subject, the likelihood is
greater that the terminology embodying specific legal obligations concerning criminalization, prosecution, punishment, extradition, judicial assistance and jurisdiction is more specific in each succeeding convention.
It is interesting to note that the evolution of the two schemes for the
enforcement of international criminal law, the direct and indirect enforce1"

See DRAFT CODE, supra note 1, at 3-19.

17

See, e.g., Pilloud, The Geneva Conventions-An Important Anniversary 1949-1969,

in INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 399 (1969). The ICRC publishes-annual reports
of its activities in the INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS.
'8 See, e.g., Bassiouni, The InternationalNarcotics Control System: A Proposal,46 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1972). The Commission on Narcotic Drugs publishes annual and peri-

odic reports, as does the Division of Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations.

19 See, e.g., Bassiouni & Nanda, Slavery and Slave Trade: Steps Toward Eradication,

in I

TREATISE, supra note 2, at 504.
20 See Saba, The Quasi Legislative Activities of Specialized Agencies, 111 RECUnM

CouRs 281 (1964).
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ment schemes, have also conceptually shaped international criminal law.
Historically, the direct enforcement system was predicated on a vision of
world order which sought to transcend political and ideological barriers.
After World War II, the hopes and expectations of many in the world
community were for the development of a direct-control system involving
the creation of an international criminal court and an international machinery of criminal justice.2 1 The first effort, excluding the Nuremberg
and Tokyo war crimes trials, was in the Convention for the Creation of an
International Criminal Court of November 16, 1937,22 which precognized
the establishment of an international criminal court. The Convention was
only ratified by India and it never entered into effect. Thereafter, there
were two efforts by the United Nations, in 1951 and 1953, to prepare a
draft statute for an international criminal court.2 3 The drafts were tabled
and no further effort has been made to revive them. In a very modest
way, the Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Genocide of
' The direct enforcement scheme is predicated on the establishment of an international criminal court and has been discussed and suggested by many publicists and international organizations. See Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, London International Assembly, Memorandum by the Secretary-General (1949),
reprinted in 1 B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CmMnNAL CouRr, A STEP TowARD WoRLD
PEAcE-A DocumENTARY HISTORY mn ANALYsis 399 (1980); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, The
Creation of an InternationalCriminal Court, in INTRNATIONAL TEmoRIsM AND PoLITICAL
CxR.cs 519 (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975); Dautricourt, The InternationalCriminal Court:The
Concept of International Jurisdiction-Definitionand Limitation of the Subject, in 1
TpATIS E, supra note 2, at 636; Nepote, The Role of an InternationalCriminalPolice in the
Context of an InternationalCriminal Court and Police Cooperation with Respect to International Crimes, in 1 TREATISE, supra note 2, at 676; J. SToNE & R. WonrzEL, ToWARD A
FSmLE INTERNATioNAL CRMmAL COURT (1970); P. CAIREU, PRoJEt D'UNE JUtsmo'rION
PENALE INTEmATIONALE

(1953); Bassiouni & Derby, FinalReport on the Establishment of

an InternationalCriminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and
Other Relevant Instruments, 9 HOFsTRA L. Rlv. 523 (1981); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, La
Creation d'une Cour Penale Internationaleet l'Administration Internationalede la Justice, 1977 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253 (1977); La Creation d'une JurisditionPenale Internationale, 45 R.I.P.D. (nos. 384 1974); Grebing, La Creation d'une Cour Penale Internationale:
Bilan et Perspectives, 45 R.I.D.P. 435 (1974); Miller, FarBeyond Nuremberg: Steps Toward InternationalCriminal Jurisdiction,61 Ky. L.J. 925 (1973); Ambion, Organizationof
a Court of InternationalCriminal Jurisdiction,29 Pu. L.J. 345 (1954); Finch, Draft Statute for an International Court, 46 Am. J. INT'L. L. 89 (1952); Glaser, Vers une Juridiction
Criminelle Internationale, 67 ScHwEizmcHE FEsTscHRr Ftm STRm cHT 281 (1952);
Wright, Proposalfor an InternationalCriminal Court, 46 AM. J. Ir'r.L. 60 (1952); YeumLi, The Establishmentof an InternationalCriminal Jurisdiction:The FirstPhase, 46 AM.
J. INT'L L. 73 (1952); Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 1951 LC.J. 15.
" Part I (2) of the Final Act of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, League of Nations Official No. C. 548. M. 385. 1937. V.
7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1951); 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
12), U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1953); see also citations listed in note 21 supra.
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December 9, 19482' specified in Article VI that there should be established an international penal tribunal which would have the authority to
adjudicate violations of the Convention. Only the Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Apartheid of November 30, 197325 specified

in Article V for the creation of an "international penal tribunal." It was
not until 1980 that the Ad Hoc Working Group on South Africa of the
Commission on Human Rights commissioned this writer to prepare a
Draft Statute for an international penal tribunal. This draft statute was
accepted by the Working Group and circulated by the Commission on
Human Rights to member states in 1981. Unfortunately, there has been
no visible progress on the subject.2 6 There have been efforts by some pub-

licists to advance this idea, but their views have not yet been embodied in
2
international instruments.

7

The inability of the world community to reach political consensus on
the creation of an international criminal court or on the development of
alternative mechanisms that would have the features of a direct enforcement system has led to the furthering of the indirect enforcement system.
This explains why an increasing number of conventions dealing with international crimes or multilateral and bilateral conventions relating to
transnational and common crimes have adopted the conceptual formula
aut dedere aut judicare.
The significant recurrent use of the explicit or implicit duty to prosecute or extradite in conventional international criminal law raises the
question of whether this establishes a jus cogens principle with respect to
international crimes. 28 In this event, the duty becomes a binding international obligation, irrespective of whether or not it is explicitly stated in
any particular convention or a customary norm. This is true so long as
the convention or customary norm explicitly or implicitly recognizes that
the conduct in question constitutes an international crime. 29 The policy

supporting the imposition of this duty is that there is no established international criminal court and therefore the only available mechanism for
enforcement is the indirect enforcement scheme based on the duty to
prosecute or extradite. Clearly, in the absence of such a duty and in light
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
11 G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 50), U.N. Doc. A/9233/Add. 1.
" Report of M.C. Bassiouni to the Ad Hoe Working Group of Experts for the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/1426 (1981), reprinted in part as Bassiouni &
Derby, FinalReport on the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant InternationalInstruments,
24

9 HoxsTm L. REv. 523 (1981).
" See citations listed in note 21 supra.
" See Bassiouni, World Public Order and Extradition:A Conceptual Evaluation, in
PROBLEME DES INTERATIONALEN STRRECwrS 10 (D. Oehler & P. Potz eds. 1970).
"' See Bassiouni, infra note 34.
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of the nonexistence of an international criminal court which would have
jurisdiction over such offenses, there would be no international criminal
law.30 Thus the duty to prosecute or extradite is concomitant to the indirect enforcement scheme without which there would be no enforceable
international criminal law, regardless of the efficacy of this mechanism.
Historically the duty to prosecute or extradite, as it emerged and developed in the writings of scholars, was not limited only to international
crimes. Indeed, it was advocated as a civitas maxima among states as
part of their duty to cooperate in the preservation of their national order
3 1 More recently it has
as well as in the preservation of world public order.
32
been advocated to apply to transnational crimes.
The duty to prosecute or extradite, even in the writings of scholars, is
an imperfect obligation with respect to non-international crimes since
these required either the existence of extradition treaties, national legislation or both. 3 In the course of the evolution of international criminal law,
the duty can also be construed as imperfect because it emerged on an ad
SOProfessor

G.O.W. Mueller is fond of quoting an unidentified "pundit" to the effect
that "there must be an international criminal law, it is taught in universities by professors."
See Mueller & Besharov, supra note 3, at 5. Hopefully the reality of enforcement can make
international criminal law more than an academic subject, as Mueller and Besharov point
out in their study. Id.
31 See H. GROTIUS, supra note 8, § IV(1). For a philosophical perception, see Murphy,
The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 477 (1982); E. DE VArrRL, LE DRorr
DES GENs, BOOK H, CIW. VL §§ 76,77 (1978), in CLASsIcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Fenwick,
trans. 1916); WOLFF, Jus G mrIuM METHODO ScmErmcA PER TRACTATUM § 152 (1764), in
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (Drake trans., 1934). S. Puffendorf, who relied on the work
of Grotius, was more of a positivist on this question, in THE ErE
r OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE, BOOK IL CHAP. III, § 23-24 (1672, W. Oldfather trans. 1931). See generally 1
M.C. BAssIoUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRAD ON IN U.S. LAw AND PRACTICE ch. 1, § 2-1 (1983);
M.C. BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADTON AND WORLD PuBLc ORDER 607 (1974); C. VAN
DE WJNGAERT, THE PoLmcAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADMON: TE DELIcATE PRORLEm

OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER 8, 132-

40 (1980); Derby, Duties and Powers Respecting Foreign Crimes, 30 AM. J. Com. L. 523,
530 n. 40 (Supp. 1982). My friend and colleague, Professor E.M. Wise, had also postulated
this hypothesis in Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 709, 720-23
(1968), and Wise, Prolegomenon to the Principles of International Criminal Law, 16
N.Y.L.F. 562, 575 (1970), but he made clear thereafter that it was only a hypothesis which
he rejected, see Wise, Book Review, 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 362, 370 n. 64 (1982).
32See Bassiouni, Working Paper on International Norms and Standards in International Criminal Law, presented to the Meeting of the U.N. Committee of Experts convening
at the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa), January 1015,- 1983, in connection with the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the
Context of Development- Challenges for the Future (1982) (unpublished) (copy on file with
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).
See M.C. BAssIouN, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADIO AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1-23
(1974); 1 M.C. BAssIouNs, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAw AND PRAcTicE ch. 1, § 3
(1983).
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hoc basis in international criminal law conventions: some conventions do
not explicitly state the duty. Only now, after consistent re-affirmation of
the duty to prosecute or extradite in conventional international criminal
law, can it be argued that this principle constitutes a jus cogens principle.
The duty itself has not been expressed with sufficient specificity to indicate whether it is an alternative or co-existent duty. Whatever little doctrine there is on the subject, it is unclear whether the duty to prosecute or
extradite is disjunctive or co-existent. As stated by this writer:
Doctrine is unclear as to the meaning of "alternative" or "disjunctive"
and "coexistent" obligations to extradite. The following distinction is
suggested. If the duty to extradite or prosecute is an alternative or disjunctive one, then there is a primary obligation to extradite if relevant
conditions are satisfied, and a secondary obligation to prosecute under
national laws if extradition cannot be granted. Thus, the duty to prosecute when it arises under national law leaves the requesting state with no
alternative recourse.
If the duty to extradite or prosecute is co-existent rather than alternative or disjunctive, then the requested state can choose between extradition or prosecution at its discretion. As a result, the state may refuse to
extradite the relator to one state, but later agree to extradite him or her
to another state or to prosecute. In any event when a state elects to prosecute then discretion plays a broader role, and can be invoked without a
breach of treaty or other international obligations.
The doctrine usually expressed is that the international obligation to
extradite or prosecute if it exists would be construed as a co-existent
duty provided that national law permits it.
There is a general doctrinal failure to consider. states' international
obligations deriving from treaties regarding international crimes, such as
war crimes, slavery and slave-related practices, aircraft hijacking, and the
kidnapping or taking as hostage of diplomats or civilians, etc. Almost all
of the multilateral conventions regarding these international crimes specifically require signatory states to extradite or prosecute violators of the
treaties' proscriptions: in other words, they place upon states the alternative duty aut dedere Out judicare. Thus, a signatory state to such conventions that refuses to extradite an alleged offender of one of these proscriptions, when the conventions constitute the legal basis for the
extradition request, is under a positive duty to prosecute the individual.
Failing this, the requested state is in violation of its obligations under
the conventions.'
Bassiouni, General Report on the JuridicalStatus of the Requested State Denying
Extradition, in PROCEEDINGS OF XITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CoMrARATIVE LAW OF
1982 (in print).
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CONCLUSION

For a given act or conduct to be deemed an international crime is by
virtue of its inclusion in an international convention containing one or
more of the eight penal characteristics previously described. While this
article examines the characteristics of international criminal law, it also
raises the question of defining the rationale of international crimes;
namely, the international and transnational elements. Presently neither
international instruments nor contemporary doctrine has provided a satisfactory framework for defining these elements and identifying3 their
con5
tent and parameters. This remains a task to be accomplished.

"5The some 325 conventions having any of the eight penal characteristics outlined in
this article will be the object of a book by this author entitled INTmNATONAL CRUM: A
DIGM/INDEX OF CONVENTIONS AND REvT
PENAL PROvisIONS (Oceana 1984). It will contain a list of these conventions and their appropriate references and alternative citations as
well as a chart detailing these seven characteristics outlined herein and excerpts of these
provisions from the conventions.

